We consider the problem of dividing some amount of an infinitely divisible and homogeneous resource among agents having claims on this resource that cannot be jointly honored. A "rule" associates with each such problem a feasible division. Our goal is to uncover the structure of the space of rules. For that purpose, we study "operators" on the space, that is, mappings that associate to each rule another one. Duality, claims truncation, attribution of minimal rights, and convex combinations are the four operators we consider. We first establish a number of results linking these operators, such as idempotence, commutativity, and distributivity. Then, we determine which properties of rules are preserved under each of these operators, and which are not.
Introduction
We address the problem of dividing some amount of an infinitely divisible and homogeneous resource among agents having claims on this resource that cannot be jointly honored. A primary example is when the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm has to be allocated among its creditors. A "division rule" is a function that associates with each situation of this kind, which we call a "claims problem", a division of the amount available. We call this division an "awards vector". It is interpreted as the choice that a judge or arbitrator could make. In the search for the most desirable rules, the literature 1 , initiated by O'Neill (1982) , has proceeded on several fronts, much recent progress having been made on the axiomatic front.
We will consider the issue from a higher perspective than is standard however, and examine the space of rules itself. Our goal is to uncover its structure. When surveying the literature, one is struck by the richness of the inventory of rules that have been proposed. This richness is also confusing and one feels the need to put some order in the inventory, to organize it in some fashion. Several approaches can be taken for this purpose. The first approach simply consists in searching for resemblances between rules, in their formulas and in the geometry of their graphs. Rules can be usefully organized in families exploiting these resemblances. The parametric family introduced by Young (1987) , as well as certain families defined by Thomson (2000) , collect a number of important rules that can be described in a common way. The identification of these families allows us to relate rules to one another and also to understand what is unique to each of them. A second approach is to organize rules by means of the properties they share. Axiomatic analysis is the principal methodology here. Of course, these two approaches are related. The general formulas that one writes down to gather rules among which one has recognized patterns will often cause all members of the family to share certain properties.
The approach we follow here is based on a third way of "connecting" rules. It exploits and generalizes a phenomenon one quickly notices, namely that one can often pass from a rule to another by means of a simple algebraic or geometric operation. Let us define an "operator" on the space of rules as a mapping that associates with each rule another one. We propose to undertake a systematic study of such objects. We consider four of them. First is a duality operator. When looking at a claims problem, two perspectives can be taken: we can think of the issue as dividing what is available; or, as dividing this deficit (the difference between the sum of the claims and the amount to divide). Let S be a rule. The rule associated with S by the duality operator, its "dual", treats what is available in the same way as S treats what is missing. The second operator associates with S the rule defined for each problem by first truncating claims at the amount to divide and then applying S to the problem so revised. The rule associated with S by the third operator calculates the awards vector for each problem in two steps: first, each claimant is attributed the difference between the amount to divide and the sum of the claims of the other agents (or 0 if this difference is negative); this difference is an obvious minimum to which he is entitled; second, S is applied to allocate what remains, the part that is truly contested, claims being adjusted down by the "minimal rights" of the first step. The last operator differs from the others as its arguments are lists of rules and weights for the rules: it produces the weighted average of the rules.
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We establish a number of results linking the four operators. Obviously the duality operator composed with itself is the identity; also the claims truncation operator composed with itself is equivalent to itself; somewhat less obvious is that a similar statement holds for the attribution of minimal rights operator. We then show that if two rules are dual, then the version of one obtained by subjecting it to the attribution of minimal rights operator is dual to the version of the other obtained by subjecting it to the claims truncation operator. Next, we study the composition of the claims truncation and attribution of minimal rights operators (a composition on which a rule suggested by Curiel, Maschler, and Tijs, 1987, is based) . We show that the order in which they are composed does not matter: the rule that results is independent of the order. Second, in the two-claimant case, starting from any two rules satisfying the basic property that claimants having equal claims should receive equal amounts, subjecting them to the composition of the two operators always produces the same rule. Third, this rule is not just any rule, but it is one that has been central in the literature. We refer to it as "concede-and-divide" because it emerges from the following natural two-step scenario: each claimant first concedes to the other the difference between the amount to divide and his own claim (or 0 if this difference is negative); what remains, the part that we described earlier as being truly contested, is divided equally (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) . Finally, we show that the convexity operator is distributive with respect to each of the other three operators.
Given a property that a rule may have, a natural question is whether the property is also enjoyed by the rule obtained by subjecting it to a certain operator. The fact that a property is preserved under an operator is an interesting and very useful feature it may have. We show that, of the properties that have been frequently discussed in the literature, most are preserved under the duality operator, but our main results concerning this operator pertain to two basic monotonicity properties, which somewhat surprisingly, are not. One is "claims monotonicity": if an agent's claim increases, his award should be at least as large as it was initially. The other is "population monotonicity": upon the arrival of additional claimants, the award to each claimant initially present should be at most as large as it was initially.
Next, we turn to the claims truncation and attribution of minimal rights operators. These operators tend to be more disruptive, but they are disruptive in "symmetric" ways. We also study their composition and find that the central property of "self-duality"-invariance under the duality operatorwhich is preserved by neither operator, is preserved under their composition.
The convexity operator preserves most properties, but not all, and we give two important examples of properties that are not preserved. One is "consistency", which says that the choice made for each problem should always be in agreement with the choice made for the problem derived from it by imagining that some claimants leave with their awards, and reevaluating the situation from the viewpoint of the remaining claimants. The second property is "converse consistency", which says that a certain awards vector should be chosen for a problem if for each two-claimant subgroup of the claimants it involves, its restriction to that subgroup is chosen for the problem these claimants face when the complementary group of claimants leave with their awards.
Our results have a number of benefits. First, as was our goal, they allow us to structure the existing inventory of rules available to solve claims problems, and to help ensure that no important rule has been missed. The structural relations between the operators we uncover also allow us to provide easy proofs that certain properties hold for particular rules (examples are the properties established by Curiel, Maschler, and Tijs, 1987 , for the rule they define), and they should also be useful in identifying which properties each newly constructed rule may or may not satisfy. Finally, the operators-the duality operator is particularly useful in this regard-allow us to derive new characterizations from existing ones. (For an earlier example of such a derivation, see Herrero and Villar, 2001) . Altogether, we believe that they help clarify the existing literature, and that they will provide useful tools to keep it organized as it develops further.
Model
There is a finite set of claimants, N . Each agent i ∈ N has a claim c i ∈ R + over an amount to divide E ∈ R + . This amount is insufficient to honor all the claims. Altogether, a claims problem is a pair (c,
denote the class of all claims problems. An awards vector of (c, E) is a point of R N + bounded above by c and whose coordinates add up to E, a condition we call "efficiency". Let X(c, E) be the set of awards vectors of (c, E). A rule is a function defined on C N that associates with each (c, E) ∈ C N an awards vector of (c, E). Let S be our generic notation for rules. For the two-claimant case, a rule can be conveniently described in a two-dimensional space by representing, for each claims vector, the path followed by the awards vector as the amount to divide increases from 0 to the sum of the claims. We refer to this path as the path of awards of the rule for this claims vector. We denote by p(S, c) the path of awards of S for c.
We also consider a variable-population version of the model. There is a population of "potential" claimants, either N, the set of natural numbers, or some subset of it. However, only a finite number of claimants are present at any given time. Let N be the class of finite subsets of the set of potential claimants. To specify a claims problem, we first choose N ∈ N , then (c, E) ∈ C N . A rule is a function defined over ∪ N ∈N C N , which associates with each N ∈ N and each (c, E) ∈ C N , an awards vector of (c, E).
Operators
Next, we define the four operators with which we are concerned. Aumann and Maschler (1985) , who provide motivation for it, as well as note passages in the Talmud to support their thesis that its seed was already there:
It is easy to check that the pair (c, c i −E) is a well-defined problem and that S = S, we can speak of rules being "dual" of each other. Examples of dual rules are the constrained equal awards rule, CEA, which equates the amounts received by all claimants subject to no one receiving more than his claim, and the constrained equal losses rule, CEL, which equates the losses experienced by all claimants subject to no one receiving a negative amount: formally, CEA(c, E) ≡ (min{c i , α}) i∈N , and CEL(c, E) ≡ (max{0, c i − α}) i∈N , where in each case, α ∈ R + is chosen so as to achieve efficiency. Figure 1a illustrates the definitions, and this duality, for |N | = 2.
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A rule is self-dual if it treats the problem of dividing what is available symmetrically to the problem of dividing what is missing (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) . . A number of rules are self-dual. An obvious example is the proportional rule, P , which chooses awards proportional to claims: formally, for each (c, E) ∈ C N , P (c, E) ≡ αc, where α ∈ R + is chosen so as to achieve efficiency. However, other important rules share this property. One of them is the Talmud rule, T al, (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) , which can
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• 45 be described as a hybrid of CEA and CEL. The former is used for E ≤ c i 2 , each claim being first divided by two; the latter is used for the remaining cases, here too, c 2 being used in the formula. Another is the random arrival rule, RA (O'Neill, 1982 ; see Thomson, 1998 , for a proof), which assigns to each claimant the expected value of what he would obtain on a first-come first-serve basis, assuming that all orders of arrival of claimants occur with equal probabilities. 2. Claims truncation.
The second operator truncates claims: given (c, E) ∈ C N , each claim that is greater than E is replaced by E. The operator O t is critical for the study of claims problems as "games with transferable utility" (O'Neill, 1982) . Indeed, if a rule is such that for each problem, the awards vector it recommends is the payoff vector chosen by a solution to TU games for the game associated with the problem in the manner first suggested by O'Neill (1982) 7 , then it is invariant under O t (Curiel, 6 For references to the relevant ancient literature, see O'Neill (1982) , Aumann and Maschler (1985) , Young (1987), and Dagan (1996) . Both CEA and CEL are discussed by Maimonides. Proportionality is explicitly advocated by Aristotle as the basis for "just" distribution. The Talmud rule is defined by Aumann and Maschler (1985) to rationalize numerical examples given in the Talmud. We should also mention the "minimal overlap rule", M O, (O'Neill, 1982) , which calculates awards by arranging claims over the amount to divide so as to minimize in a lexicographic way the extent to which they conflict, and then dividing each unit equally among all agents claiming it. Remarkably, RA, M O, and T al all coincide for |N | = 2; moreover, they coincide with "concede-and-divide", defined below. For further discussion of these relationships, see Thomson (2003) . We will see below that many other rules share this feature.
7 Given (c, E) ∈ C N , and S ⊆ N , the "worth of S" is defined to be max{E − i∈N \S c i , 0}. "Correspondences" between rules and solutions to coalitional games have proved to be very useful tools in the literature on the problem of claims resolution. Maschler and Tijs, 1987) . Formally, for each (c, E) ∈ C N and each i ∈ N , let t i (c, E) ≡ min{c i , E} denote agent i's truncated claim at the amount to divide, and t(c, E) ≡ (t i (c, E)) i∈N the vector of truncated claims. Figure 1b illustrates O t applied to P for |N | = 2.
Rule S operated from truncated claims,
The inequality between c i and E is not reversed by the truncation: after carrying it out, we still have a well-defined claims problem.
If a rule is invariant under O t , we say that it is invariant under claims truncation: then, for each (c, E) ∈ C N , one can equivalently calculate the awards vector (i) directly, or (ii) after truncating claims at E (Dagan, 1996) .
3. Attribution of minimal rights. Given (c, E) ∈ C N and i ∈ N , it is natural to think of the difference E − N \{i} c j , (or 0 if this difference is negative), as a minimal amount that he can reasonably expect. There should be no dispute about this payment. Given any rule S, a version of it can be defined by first attributing to each claimant his minimal amount; then after adjusting all claims down by these "first-round awards", applying S to divide the remainder. This remainder is what is truly disputed. (Curiel, Maschler and Tijs, 1987) , and
here too, at the second round, we obtain a well-defined claims problem.
If a rule is invariant under O m , we say that it satisfies minimal rights first: then, for each problem, one can equivalently calculate the awards vector (i) directly, or (ii) in two steps, first attributing to each claimant his "minimal right", and after adjusting down each agent's claim by his minimal right, dividing what remains (Curiel, Maschler, and Tijs, 1987) .
4. Convexity. Our final operator takes several arguments, but we will refer to it in the singular. When two rules express opposite viewpoints on how to solve a claims problem, it is natural to compromise between them by averaging. More generally, we consider a flexible formulation that allows arbitrary convex combinations. Let K be a finite index set and ∆ 
Weighted average of rules (S
That O c is well-defined is a direct consequence of the fact that the set of awards vectors is a convex set.
Relating the operators
The following theorem describes the result of composing each of the first three operators with itself. It uses the following notation, which appears repeatedly in the sections to follow. Given any rule S, the rule obtained by subjecting it to the operator O We omit the obvious proof of the second statement. To prove the last statement, let (c, E) ∈ C N . We need to show that, in the problem obtained from (c, E) by attributing minimal rights, namely (c − m(c, E), E − m j (c, E)), minimal rights are all 0. Let i ∈ N , and note that claimant i's minimal right in this revised problem is equal to
After canceling out terms, we obtain the expression 8 We find this notation a little easier in formulas than
The standard proof of this fact can be found in Herrero and Villar (2002) .
which is easily seen to be equal to 0, by using the definition of m i (c, E).
For |N | = 2, straightforward calculations reveal that CEA subjected to O m and CEL subjected to O t are dual. Indeed, they both coincide with concede-and-divide, CD. This rule is defined only for |N | = 2 but it is very important because a large number of ways of looking at the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims lead to it.
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Formally, setting
). This duality result is not an accident. It is a consequence of the following theorem:
Theorem 2 Let S and R be two dual rules. Then S m and R t are dual too.
Since S is dual to R,
, 10 The following scenario, which provided the reason for the name we chose for the rule, is one of them (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) : agent i, by claiming c i , is implicitly conceding to claimant j the difference E −c i , or 0 if this difference is negative, namely max{E −c i , 0}. Similarly, by claiming c j , agent j can be understood as conceding max{E − c j , 0} to agent i. Let us first attribute to each claimant the amount conceded to him by the other (this can be done because the sum of these concessions is at most as large as the amount to divide), and in a second step let us divide the remainder, the "contested part", equally (no agent ends up with more than his claim).
and substituting in ( * ), we obtain
We prove this equality by showing that for each
If E ≤ N \{i} c j , then max{E − N \{i} c j , 0} = 0 and the left-hand side of ( * * ) is c i ; the right-hand side is also c i . If N \{i} c j < E, the left-hand side of ( * * ) is c i − E + N \{i} c j = −E + N c j , and so is the right-hand side.
We give two other illustrations of Theorem 2 for |N | = 2. First, an implication of this theorem is that if a rule S is such that S m is self-dual and
. This is what occurs for Piniles' rule, Pin, which is defined, for each (c, E) ∈ C N , by applying CEA when E ≤ c i 2 , but using in the formula c 2 instead of c itself; then, doing so again when
, α}) i∈N , and otherwise, P in(c, E) ≡ (
, α}) i∈N , where in each case, α ∈ R + is chosen so as to achieve efficiency. The rule is represented for |N | = 2 in Figure 2b and its dual in Figure 2e . It is easy to calculate that for |N | = 2, P in
= CD, as is also easily verified ( Figure 2d ). As a final illustration of Theorem 2, once again we consider P in for |N | = 2, but this time we subject it to O t . The resulting rule is shown in Figure 2c 
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• 45 question since neither order appears more compelling than the other. Fortunately, the answer is no. We give the proof of this invariance first for |N | = 2, as it is very transparent, and also because then, not only is the resulting rule independent of the order, but it is also independent of which rule is taken as a starting point, provided the rule assigns equal awards to agents with equal claims. This is the property of equal treatment of equals: for each
. Moreover, the end-result is CD. This feature of CD is in fact one of the reasons why we feel that this rule is so important.
A preliminary observation is worth making: after being subjected to O t , any rule satisfying equal treatment of equals chooses equal division if the amount to divide is at most as large as the smallest claim. Also, under O m , for a rule satisfying equal treatment of equals, if the amount to divide is at least as large as the sum of the n − 1 largest claims, all claimants experience equal losses. and claimant 2 whatever is left.
Case 3: c 2 < E. The amounts conceded are E − c 2 and E − c 1 . Claims are adjusted down to c 1 −(E −c 2 ) and c 2 −(E −c 1 ), and the amount that remains available is E − (E − c i ). After truncation at this revised amount, claims are equal (and in fact, equal to the revised amount to divide c 1 + c 2 − E). Then, in this second round, by equal treatment of equals, equal division of what remains prevails.
It is easy to see that the awards made in each of the three cases are those specified by CD, and that reversing the order in which the two operators are composed also yields CD.
If in Theorem 3, equal treatment of equals is dropped, order independence still holds but now a family of rules is obtained (defined in Hokari and Thomson, 2003) . If the rule is such that multiplying all data of a problem by some positive number results in a problem whose awards vector is obtained from the awards vector of the original problem by the same multiplication (see below for a more formal statement of this property of "homogeneity"), a one-parameter subfamily is obtained. In the general n-claimant case, we lose uniqueness also, but not order independence.
Theorem 4 For each rule S, we have S
Proof: The proof is in three steps. Let (c, E) ∈ C N be given.
Step 1:
Step 2:
By
Step 1, we only need to show that for each i ∈ N ,
Using the definitions of t(·, ·) and m(·, ·), Relation Ri reads:
Adding max{E − N \{i} c j , 0} to both sides, we have to prove that
Hence, both left and right hand sides of ( * ) are equal to c i .
Step 3: Conclusion. Using Step 2 and Step 1 in turn, we obtain,
It is natural to ask what would happen if the operators O t
and O m were reapplied. The answer is: nothing. We have already noted that once minimal rights are attributed, claims adjusted down by the minimal rights, and the amount to divide adjusted down by the sum of the minimal rights, the minimal rights of the problem that results are all 0. In other words, the minimal rights in (c − m(c, E), E − m j (c, E)) are all 0 (Theorem 1). But consider the problem obtained from the above by truncating claims at the amount to divide. In this new problem,
we assert that minimal rights are still all 0. Formally: − m(c, E) , E ), 0} = 0. Replacing E by its value, this is equivalent to showing that
and using the equality established in the proof of Theorem 4 (Relation Ri),
, and equivalently that
To prove ( * ) , we distinguish two cases.
Case 1: there is j ∈ N \{i} such that c j ≥ E. Then the left-hand side of ( * ) is at most equal to 0, whereas the right-hand side is 0. The desired inequality is satisfied.
Case 2: there is no such j. Then the left-hand side of ( * ) is equal to E− N \{i} c j and the right-hand side is the maximum of that same expression and 0. Once again, the desired inequality is satisfied. 
id (Thm 1) [
Similar formulas hold with either the minimal rights or duality operators replacing the claims truncation operator.
12 Table 1 here.
Preservation of properties under operators
In this section we undertake a systematic investigation of which properties are preserved under the operators defined in the previous section. The properties we consider have a straightforward interpretation, and to save space we refer readers to earlier literature for motivation and formal definitions. For the same reason, we do not consider properties that have been less frequently discussed.
13
We apologize for the enumeration, which nevertheless has the advantage of gathering all the material we need. Formal definitions can be found in Thomson (2003) . The proofs are available from the authors upon request.
Order preservation (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) : if agent i's claim is at least as large as agent j's claim, his award should be at least as large as agent j's award; also, his loss should be at least as large as agent j's 12 We use superscripts either to indicate an operator or a number, but the context always makes it clear which is intended.
13 Additional results are listed in Thomson (2005b) .
loss; group order preservation (Thomson, 1998; Chambers and Thomson, 2002) : given two groups of claimants, if the aggregate claim of the first group is at least as large as the aggregate claim of the second group, similar inequalities should hold between the aggregate award of the two groups, as well as between the aggregate loss incurred by the two groups; anonymity: any "renaming" of claimants should be accompanied by a parallel reassignment of awards; homogeneity: if claims and amount to divide are multiplied by the same positive number, so should all awards; and continuity: the awards vector should be a continuous function of the data of the problem. Next are monotonicity properties. They are claims monotonicity: if an agent's claim increases, his award should be at least as large as it was initially; resource monotonicity: if the amount to divide increases, each claimant's award should be at least as large as it was initially.
14 Our next group consists of invariance properties. First is no advantageous transfer (Moulin, 1987; Ju, Miyagawa, and Sakai, 2004) : no group of claimants should receive more in the aggregate as a result of redistributing their claims among themselves. Two "composition" properties follow. If the amount to divide decreases from some initial value, this decrease can be dealt with in either one of two ways: (i) by canceling the initial division and recalculating the awards for the final amount; (ii) by taking the awards calculated on the basis of the initial amount as claims in dividing the final amount. Composition down (Moulin, 2000a) says that (i) and (ii) should result in the same awards vector. Now, suppose that instead, the amount to divide increases from some initial value. Here too, we can handle this increase in either one of two ways: (i) by canceling the initial division and simply recalculating the awards for the final amount; (ii) by letting claimants keep their initial awards, revising their claims down by these awards, and reapplying the rule to divide the incremental amount (the difference between the final and initial amounts). Composition up (Young, 1987) says that (i) and (ii) should give the same awards vector.
We close with several properties pertaining to the variable-population version of the model. Population monotonicity (Thomson, 1983) : if new claimants arrive, the award to each of the claimants initially present should be at most as large as it was initially; 15 replication invariance (for a study of 14 For the "inequality conditions", a "strict" version is obtained by requiring that the conclusion should be strict if the inequality appearing in the hypothesis is strict.
15 For a survey of the literature on population monotonicity, see Thomson (1995) .
the idea in this context, see Chun and Thomson, 2005) : the awards vector of a replica problem should be the replica of the awards vector of the problem that is replicated (in the k-replica of a problem, each claimant has k − 1 clones with claims equal to his and the amount to divide is multiplied by k); consistency (Young, 1987 , is the author of the most general results on the subject
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): if some claimants leave with their awards and the problem of dividing among the remaining claimants what is left is considered, these claimants should receive the same awards as was decided initially; converse consistency (see Chun, 1999, and Thomson, 2005a , for discussions of the property in this context): suppose that an awards vector x is such that its restriction to each two-claimant group is chosen for the problem of dividing between them the sum of their components of x; then, x should be chosen.
We say that a property is preserved under an operator if whenever a rule satisfies it, so does the rule obtained by subjecting to the operator. In the following pages, we discuss which properties are preserved under our operators, and which are not. The results are summarized in Table 2 . We omit most proofs. The appendix contains the proofs of those results that are more difficult or from which a lesson can be drawn. For the remaining properties, the proofs are available from the authors upon request.
1. Duality operator. The properties that are preserved under the duality operator are numerous. We say that two properties are dual if whenever a rule satisfies one of them, its dual satisfies the other. A simple example of a pair of dual properties are the two parts of order preservation. This is most easily seen for |N | = 2, thanks to the convenient geometric interpretation of self-duality. Let N ≡ {1, 2} and c ∈ R Indeed, let i ∈ N , and note that
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After canceling out c i from both sides of this inequality and replacing c j −E by E , we obtain γ ≥ S
Second is population monotonicity. Its dual says that if new claimants arrive and the amount to divide increases by an amount equal to the sum of their claims, then the award to none of the claimants initially present should decrease. Indeed, for each N ⊂ N , and each i ∈ N , the inequality We omit the "dual" proof for the other direction.
E). After canceling out c i from both sides of the inequality sign and introducing
Theorem 6 suggests an additional definition: two operators are dual if whenever a property is preserved under the first one, the dual property is preserved under the second one. According to this definition, O separately, then clearly it is preserved under their composition. However, a property may be preserved under neither of these operators and yet be preserved under their composition. An example is self-duality, for which we obtain the following result, which is a corollary of Theorem 7.
Corollary 1 If a rule is self-dual, the version of the rule obtained by truncating claims first and then attributing minimal rights is also self-dual.
Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (1987) take P as a starting point and define a new rule from it by first attributing minimal rights and then truncating claims. They show that their rule is self-dual by invoking a game-theoretic argument. Since P is self-dual, this result can be obtained as an application of Corollary 1.
Typically 4. Convexity operator. We conclude with the convexity operator, for which no particular remarks need be made. It preserves quite a few properties, but not several important ones. We simply refer to Table 2 for the complete list.
Conclusion
Concerning the extent to which the operators preserve properties, we can offer no strict ranking, but only an informal observation that of the four operators, the convexity operator tends to be the least disruptive. Also, due to the duality between the claims truncation and attribution of minimal rights operators, these two operators are equivalent in that regard. Switching our focus from operators to properties, here no easy generalization can be made: punctual properties (properties of rules that apply to each point in their domain separately, such as order preservation) do not seem to be preserved more frequently than relational properties (properties of rules that relate the choices they make for problems that are related in some way, such as resource monotonicity). A similar statement can be made about the fixed-population properties as compared to the variable-population properties. In each cell for which a negative result holds, we indicate in parenthesis a rule allowing to prove the assertion. For instance, the notation (P ) at the intersection of the row labelled "group order preservation" and column labelled "truncation" means that P satisfies the property but that P t does not.
APPENDIX
In this appendix, we provide the proofs of selected results presented in Table 2 . We use the following additional notation. Given
] denotes the segment connecting them and seg]x
Proposition 2 The following properties are not preserved under the duality operator but they come in dual pairs: invariance under claims truncation and minimal rights first; composition down and composition up.
For the proof of the second part of this proposition, we use the following "equal sacrifice rule" (Young, 1988; Moulin, 2000a) . Let u: R → R be the function defined by u(
, where β ∈ R + is chosen so as to achieve efficiency.)
Proof: The duality between invariance under claims truncation and minimal rights first is proved by Herrero (1998) (Dagan, 1996 , proves a related result).
Minimal rights first: CEL can be used to make the point. One can also appeal to the example used to prove that invariance under claims truncation is not preserved and to the fact that this property and minimal rights first are dual properties.
Composition down: We assert first that ES u satisfies composition down. To see this, let (c, E) ∈ C N be given and ) and
. This is impossible since β is uniquely determined.
(a) The duality between the two composition properties is proved by Moulin (2000a) .
Our next result concerns claims monotonicity, a property that is satisfied by every rule encountered in the literature.
19
Unfortunately we have:
Proposition 3 Claims monotonicity is not preserved under the duality operator.
The proof is by means of an example. It is of interest that the example is anonymous, order-preserving, homogeneous, and resource monotonic (and therefore resource continuous; it is in fact fully continuous, that is, jointly continuous with respect to the claims and the amount to divide). This shows that these properties do not help preserve claims monotonicity. Here too, few of the standard rules satisfy the stronger requirement that an agent whose claim increases should receive more, unless E = 0 of course (equality is not permitted any more). The rule P is a rare example that does. However, it is easy to construct rules that do. Most "parametric rules" (Young, 1987) do. Figure 4 illustrates that when agent 2's claim is fixed at a, and as agent 1's claim increases from 0 to ∞, agent 1's award does not decrease. The claims monotonicity of S is a consequence of this fact and of its being anonymous and homogeneous. The figure indicates some paths p(S, c) for c ∈ R N + with c 2 = a. We show that these paths never cross. Given any claims vector c of the form c ≡ (c 1 , a) for c 1 ∈ [a, ∞[, there is a claims vector on seg [(a, 0) ,c] that is proportional to it. We call µ ≥ 1 the expansion factor required to pass from the latter to the former, using the same superscript to keep track of this pairing,c * and µ * c * being an example of a pair so defined. , agent 2's claim being kept fixed at a.
,c], p(S, c) = p(P, c).
The strengthening of claims monotonicity obtained by requiring that if an agent's claim increases, he should receive more, is not preserved under the duality operator either. To see this, it suffices to modify the example used to prove Proposition 3. Informally, for each c ∈ I 1 ∪ I 2 , replace the vertical segment of p(S, c) by a very steep segment whose slope varies continuously and monotonically between ∞ and 2 as c varies in I 1 ∪ I 2 from c to c * * .
Proposition 4 Claims monotonicity is not preserved under the attribution of minimal rights operator.
We prove this result by exhibiting a rule that is claims monotonic, but once subjected to O m , it is not. Although the assertion can be proved by means of the example used to prove Proposition 7, we exhibit here a rule that is order preserving, anonymous, resource monotonic, and continuous. Step 1: Construction of S. We first consider c ∈ R (c 2 , c 1 ) ). This guarantees that S is anonymous.
Step 2: S is claims monotonic. Since S is anonymous, it is enough to examine the rule in the region {c ∈ R 
, c ]. The conclusion follows from the fact that since c 2 > c 2 and c 1 = c 1 , then c 2 − c 1 < c 2 − c 1 , and since g is increasing, g(
Step 3 
Thus, as agent 1's claim increases from c 1 = 1 to c 1 = 2, he receives less, in violation of claims monotonicity.
Next, we turn to population monotonicity for which a negative result also holds. We prove this fact by exhibiting a rule S that is anonymous, homogeneous, and resource monotonic, and population monotonic but S Step 1: Construction of S. On the subdomain of two-claimant problems, S ≡ P . Let Q be the unit cube in R N + , and for each t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, let F t be the face of Q consisting of all c ∈ R N + such that c t = 1. Given c ≡ (c 1 , 1, c 3 ) = (1, 1, 1), a typical claims vector in F 2 , let L be the line passing through c and e ≡ (1, 1, 1). Also, let x ≡ L ∩ seg[( . This construction guarantees that S is anonymous and homogeneous.
Step 2: S is population monotonic. Let E > 0 and c ≡ (c 1 , 1, c 3 ) be an arbitrary point in F 2 . We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: 0 < c 1 + c 3 ≤ 1. Then, S(c, E) ≡ P (c, E). Since S(c N , E) ≡ P (c N , E) for each N with |N | = 2 and P is population monotonic, the population-monotonicity inequalities hold. . Since c 3 ≥ y 3 and 1 + c 3 ≤ 2, then z 3 − z 3 ≥ 0.
Also z 2 − z 2 = = CD. Since CD is claims monotonic, then S violates equal treatment of equals. In addition, still for |N | = 2, the "weighted concede-and-divide rules" are the only rules satisfying homogeneity, invariance under claims truncation, and minimal rights first (Hokari and Thomson, 2003) . Since these rules are claims monotonic, then S violates homogeneity. However, we design S to be claims continuous and resource monotonic. An ingredient of our construction is the "sequential priority rule associated with the order 2 ≺ 1," denoted D
2≺1
, which, as the amount to divide increases from 0, assigns all of it to claimant 2 until he is fully compensated, and only then starts compensating claimant 1. Claims monotonicity of S means that the paths of awards associated with two claims vectors that differ in only one coordinate do not cross.
Proof: We define a rule S on C N , where N ≡ {1, 2}. We show that S is claims monotonic whereas S t•m is not.
